- Devel - lists.sequoia-pgp.org

Interest in Auditing Sequoia-PGP
by Tanveer Salim 20 Sep '25

20 Sep '25

Hello Sequoia-Developers! I am interested in auditing Sequoia-PGP in my spare time both because I rely on Sequoia-PGP to protect my safety and to build my career in cryptographic software development. Aside from practicing attacking crypto code on websites such as CryptoPals (cryptopals.com) what people, projects, and techniques can I engage in to build this skill--both in auditing and cryptographic software development? I am currently discussing the matter on Reddit (https://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/1nkfat9/comment/nf9q9va/?context=3). I came to the conclusion I am interested in auditing low-level cryptographic primitives and protocols (e.g. Sequoia-PGP and the primitive implementations it depends on). On the forum another person admitted getting involved in projects such as Sequoia is a good way to get one's foot in the door. One can also participate in professional and hacking communities. Would the Sequoia developers be able to recommend any to get started? The other person on the Reddit forum admitted PQC encryption is currently an in-demand field though we are in a "bubble". Would the Sequoia-PGP developers agree with this? What companies should one seek that develop and audit cryptographic software in an ethical manner that promote privacy. Personally I use products such as Mullvad, Bitwarden, Signal, Tuta, Posteo, etc. How does one identify good companies for employment in the field of cryptographic development for privacy's sake. It seems there are a lot of political arguments about this--and certain companies have made decisions that the privacy community (at least on forums like Reddit) did not favor. I am just asking because I don't want to work with people that exploit such technology for their own gains instead of caring for privacy and freedom of speech in itself as it should be. I would love to hear the Sequoia-PGP developer's thoughts. Best, Tanveer Salim I also found Soatok's blog post on the matter insightful: https://soatok.blog/2020/06/10/how-to-learn-cryptography-as-a-programmer/ I decided to ask you since you have experience in cryptographic development. Please let me know your thoughts. Thanks! Best, Tanveer Salim

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Interest in Auditing Sequoia-PGP in the Near Future
by Tanveer Salim 20 Sep '25

20 Sep '25

Hello Mr. Pornin! I am interested in auditing Sequoia-PGP in my spare time both because I rely on Sequoia-PGP to protect my safety and to build my career in cryptographic software development. Aside from practicing attacking crypto code on websites such as CryptoPals (cryptopals.com) what people, projects, and techniques can I engage in to build this skill--both in auditing and cryptographic software development? I am currently discussing the matter on Reddit (https://www.reddit.com/r/crypto/comments/1nkfat9/comment/nf9q9va/?context=3). I came to the conclusion I am interested in auditing low-level cryptographic primitives and protocols (e.g. Sequoia-PGP and the primitive implementations it depends on). On the forum another person admitted getting involved in projects such as Sequoia is a good way to get one's foot in the door. One can also participate in professional and hacking communities. Would the Sequoia developers be able to recommend any to get started? The other person on the Reddit forum admitted PQC encryption is currently an in-demand field though we are in a "bubble". Would the Sequoia-PGP developers agree with this? What companies should one seek that develop and audit cryptographic software in an ethical manner that promote privacy. Personally I use products such as Mullvad, Bitwarden, Signal, Tuta, Posteo, etc. How does one identify good companies for employment in the field of cryptographic development for privacy's sake. It seems there are a lot of political arguments about this--and certain companies have made decisions that the privacy community (at least on forums like Reddit) did not favor. I am just asking because I don't want to work with people that exploit such technology for their own gains instead of caring for privacy and freedom of speech in itself as it should be. I would love to hear the Sequoia-PGP developer's thoughts. Best, Tanveer Salim I also found Soatok's blog post on the matter insightful: https://soatok.blog/2020/06/10/how-to-learn-cryptography-as-a-programmer/ I decided to ask you since you have experience in cryptographic development. Please let me know your thoughts. Thanks! Best, Tanveer Salim

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Support for Post Quantum Cryptography
by Tanveer Salim 09 Sep '25

09 Sep '25

Hello Sequoia Developers, I was just wondering if adding support for post-quantum cryptography is planned in the near future. Algorithms such as Classic McEliece, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, etc. If so please let me know the schedule. If not how come. I thank the developers in advance for any responses! Best, Tanveer Salim

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Thoughts on the Integrity of the GNUPG Developers
by Tanveer Salim 09 Sep '25

09 Sep '25

Hello Sequoia Developers, I am aware that some of the Sequoia PGP developers used to be GNUPG developers. Would these ex-GNUPG developers say the GNUPG developers are still trustworthy to protect our privacy? I admit I still use GNUPG in the command line just for now and am hoping to be able to use Sequoia-PGP in the near future. In the meantime I wonder what the direction of both GNUPG and Sequoia will be. Please let me know your thoughts. Best, Tanveer Salim

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Sequoia PGP's Ease-of-Use by Whisteblowers and Journalists
by Tanveer Salim 24 Aug '25

24 Aug '25

Hello Sequoia Development Team, PGP is well-known for being used by journalists and whisteblowers to speak out against human mis-treatment. Have the Sequoia PGP developers cooperated with journalists and whisteblowers before? I wonder if Seqouia's design reflects the developers' personal experiences working with such important people. Sequoia PGP was designed to have an easy-to-use interface. GNUPG, although bloated, does have third-party GUI tools to make it easier to use--if not more secure. Have the Sequoia developers been cooperating with third-party developers to make Sequoia just as accessible to the journalist and whisteblowing community as GNUPG now is I would love to know more about it if that's ok. Best, Tanveer Salim

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Fwd: Question on Support for International Algorithms
by fosres＠posteo.de 21 Aug '25

21 Aug '25

Hello Sequoia Developers, I was trying out Sequoia PGP and noticed it only supports RSA and ED25519 / Curve25519 asymmetric algorithms for now. Are there any plans to support other asymmetric algorithms used by other countries such as Brainpool, Camellia, etc? I ask because Justus mentioned countries like Germany like using Brainpool and was wondering if the Sequoia Developers were interested in adding support for such algorithms for that reason? If not how come? I thank the developers in advance for any responses! Best, Tanveer Salim -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Question on Support for International Algorithms Date: 20.08.2025 20:15 From: fosres(a)posteo.de To: devel(a)lists.sequoia-pgp.org Hello Sequoia Developers, I was trying out Sequoia PGP and noticed it only supports RSA and ED25519 / Curve25519 asymmetric algorithms for now. Are there any plans to support other asymmetric algorithms used by other countries such as Brainpool, Camellia, etc? I ask because Justus mentioned countries like Germany like using Brainpool and was wondering if the Sequoia Developers were interested in adding support for such algorithms for that reason? If not how come? I thank the developers in advance for any responses! Best, Tanveer Salim

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A Sapling Matures: Meet sq 1.0
by Neal H. Walfield 16 Dec '24

16 Dec '24

Hi all, The Sequoia PGP team is happy to announce the release of version 1.0 of sq. sq is a command-line tool for working with OpenPGP artifacts with a focus on usability, security, and robustness. https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-sq/-/blob/main/README.md After seven years of development, this is sq’s first stable release. A notable change for existing users of sq is that we will no longer change sq’s CLI in an incompatible manner. You can read the complete release announcement here: https://sequoia-pgp.org/blog/2024/12/16/202412-sq-1.0/ We've published sq on crates.io: https://crates.io/crates/sequoia-sq You can also fetch version 1.0.0 using the v1.0.0 tag: https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-sq/-/tree/v1.0.0 which Justus signed: $ git verify-tag v1.0.0 gpg: Signature made Mon Dec 16 18:23:52 2024 +01:00 gpg: using RSA key 256A4E55E4A72D97AD2468E788DC7E33385F791D gpg: Good signature from "Justus Winter <justus(a)sequoia-pgp.org>" [full] gpg: "<teythoon(a)uber.space>" gpg: "Justus Winter" Neal on behalf of the whole Sequoia PGP team

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Help with Sequoa-PGP implementation
by Abraham George 26 Mar '24

26 Mar '24

Hello, My name is Abe, and I'm one of the developers behind osvauld, an open-source credentials manager for developers (github <http://github.com/osvauld> || website <http://osvauld.com>). We're building our UI as a Chrome extension and utilizing WASM and Sequoia PGP for cryptographic operations (wasm repo <https://github.com/osvauld/crypto_primitives>). We'd greatly appreciate your expertise on a couple of key management challenges we're facing. Our current Setup: *Initial Key Generation:* When a user first logs in, they set up a passphrase. We use this passphrase to secure their certificate within the extension's local storage: ``` let (cert, _revocation) = CertBuilder::new() .add_userid("someone(a)example.org") .set_cipher_suite(CipherSuite::Cv25519) // This specifies ECC keys with Curve25519 .add_subkey(flags, None, None) .set_password(Some(passphrase)) .generate()?; ``` *Logging In:* Now when the user logs in the next time using the passphrase, passphrase and protected certificates are given to wasm it decrypts the secret key material and stores that in memory. ``` let cert = Cert::from_bytes(&private_key_bytes)?; let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); let keypair =cert.keys() .with_policy(p, None) .secret() .for_storage_encryption() .nth(0) .ok_or_else(|| "No suitable key found in Cert.")? .key() .clone() let password = Password::from(password); let decrypted_keypair = keypair.decrypt_secret(&password)?; ``` *Decryption: * When user requests for decryption ``` pub fn decrypt_message( p: &dyn Policy, sk: &Key<openpgp::packet::key::SecretParts, openpgp::packet::key::UnspecifiedRole>, ciphertext: &[u8], ) -> openpgp::Result<Vec<u8>> { let helper = Helper { secret: &sk, policy: p, }; let mut decryptor = DecryptorBuilder::from_bytes(ciphertext)?.with_policy(p, None, helper)?; let mut plaintext = Cursor::new(Vec::new()); std::io::copy(&mut decryptor, &mut plaintext)?; let plaintext = plaintext.into_inner(); Ok(plaintext) } struct Helper<'a> { secret: &'a Key<openpgp::packet::key::SecretParts, openpgp::packet::key::UnspecifiedRole>, policy: &'a dyn Policy, } impl<'a> openpgp::parse::stream::DecryptionHelper for Helper<'a> { fn decrypt<D>( &mut self, pkesks: &[openpgp::packet::PKESK], _skesks: &[openpgp::packet::SKESK], sym_algo: Option<openpgp::types::SymmetricAlgorithm>, mut decrypt: D, ) -> openpgp::Result<Option<openpgp::Fingerprint>> where D: FnMut(openpgp::types::SymmetricAlgorithm, &openpgp::crypto::SessionKey) -> bool, { // The secret key is already decrypted. let mut pair = KeyPair::from(self.secret.clone().into_keypair()?); pkesks[0] .decrypt(&mut pair, sym_algo) .map(|(algo, session_key)| decrypt(algo, &session_key)); Ok(None) } } ``` We need your advice on handling these scenarios: 1. Certificate Export: - We would like to provide users with the ability to export their unprotected certificate. Could you please advise us on how this can be achieved using the Sequoia PGP library? 2. Password Change: - In case a user needs to change their password, how can we implement this functionality within our current setup? - If directly changing the password is not feasible, would it be safe to use (KDF) to encrypt the unprotected certificate with the new password? 3. Session Key Management and Extension Constraints: Due to the limitations imposed by Chrome extension manifest v3, we are unable to securely store decrypted private keys in memory for extended periods. To address this, we are considering a hybrid approach: - Encrypt the decrypted certificate (secret key material) with a session key and store the encrypted version locally. - Store the session key securely on our server and fetch it using a user-specific token when needed. Our questions regarding this approach are: - Does the Sequoia PGP library provide any built-in functionality or provisions that can assist us in implementing this session key management scheme? - Could you offer any suggestions or best practices on how to securely implement this approach within the Sequoia framework? - Are there any alternative solutions or architectures you would recommend for managing session keys in our specific use case? Thank you for your time and for the tremendous work on Sequoia PGP! Sincerely, Abe

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The state of PGP, and Sequoia's role
by Florian Berger 11 Mar '24

11 Mar '24

Hello everyone, I have a question about the general state of the PGP ecosystem, and Sequoia's role in it, and I hope this is the right place to ask. If not, apologies, and kindly direct me somewhere more fitting. I had been an avid user and advocate of PGP until some time in 2018/2018, when first Efail surfaced (with its infamous "Don't use HTML mails" workaround [1]), and then the keyserver attacks followed. [2] In summer 2019, Latacora's "The PGP Problem" was published [3], spurring a considerable level of agreement within the community [4], and even from GnuPG development [5]. Researching these, I stumbled across even earlier PGP rejections, such as by Matthew Green in 2014 [6] and by Filipo Valsorda in 2016 [7]. And then there is secushare's "15 reasons not to start using PGP" [8]. I know that some of the criticism is about PGP as a technology, and quite a few are about the GnuPG implementation. Nonetheless, I subsequently made a hard cut, abandoned PGP-encrypted email altogether, moved sensitive communication to Signal, and tried to bring the matter to the attention of colleagues, friends and family, with varying degrees of success. Then, for some years, I ignored everything around PGP, and basically waited for it to die. Not it's 2024, people still encrypt email using PGP, Thunderbird incorporated PGP in 2020, Sequoia goes in its 7th year with increasing adoption, and I, after a long break, am trying to find out what is actually going on. My question: Is PGP, as a technology, merely on life support, and should still be generally avoided – or has it, given younger implementations such as Sequoia, become viable again as a future-proof foundation for communication, authentication etc.? Back in the day, I was especially worried about the lack of forward secrecy, keys as long term secrets and impractical identity tokens, the public WoT, and the overall complexity of the system design. That of course is a broad and somewhat audacious question. I am merely looking looking for an overview of the state of affairs from a Sequoia perspective, or respective pointers/links, since even Wikipedia just seems to sum up the status quo as "PGP and OpenPGP have been criticized". [9] [1] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2018-May/060315.html [2] https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f [3] https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/ [4] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20455780 [5] https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2019-July/062384.html [6] https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/13/whats-matter-with-pgp/ [7] https://words.filippo.io/giving-up-on-long-term-pgp/ [8] https://secushare.org/PGP [9] https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pretty_Good_Privacy&oldid=120864… Thanks for your patience and effort, Florian

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sequoia-ipc 0.31.0
by Neal H. Walfield 27 Oct '23

27 Oct '23

Hi all, I'm pleased to announce the release of version 0.31.0 of sequoia-ipc. I have published sequoia-ipc on crates.io: https://crates.io/crates/sequoia-ipc You can also fetch version 0.31.0 using the ipc/v0.31.0 tag: https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia/-/tags/ipc/v0.31.0 which I signed: $ git verify-tag ipc/v0.31.0 gpg: Signature made Fri Oct 27 16:39:49 2023 +02:00 gpg: using RSA key C03FA6411B03AE12576461187223B56678E02528 gpg: Good signature from "Neal H. Walfield <neal(a)walfield.org>" [ultimate] gpg: "Neal H. Walfield <neal(a)gnupg.org>" gpg: "Neal H. Walfield <neal(a)pep-project.org>" gpg: "Neal H. Walfield <neal(a)pep.foundation>" gpg: "Neal H. Walfield <neal(a)sequoia-pgp.org>" This is a bug fix release. The most noticeable fix is that using gpg-agent is now more robust. One problem was that when using a key managed by gpg-agent, e.g., from the chameleon, our gpg reimplementation, or from the octopus, our OpenPGP implemenation for Thunderbird, the first interaction would sometimes fail. https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-chameleon-gnupg https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia-octopus-librnp This has been improved in these commit: https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia/-/commit/648858b7b8ce1db35a6f5f4a993… https://gitlab.com/sequoia-pgp/sequoia/-/commit/c5670ce4958a33c4a7c3b861bdb… We also added support for GnuPG's loopback pinentry mode. Neal on behalf of the whole Sequoia PGP team

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